
00262

1973/05/27



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Hua, People's Kepublic of

China Ambassador to the United Nations

Mr. Kuo

Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Cmr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Sunday, May 27, 1973

10:00 - 11:15 a.m.

PLACE:

PRC Mission to the UN

New York City

[Excerpt]

Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I want to talk briefly about our meetings [in Paris] last week.

We went through the Agreement article by article. and came to a tentative agreement on Vietnam and on Laos. And we are prepared to sign a joint communique with them which calls for implementation of various parts of the Agreement. I will leave you a copy of this Communique and of the understanding on Laos as it now stands. [Dr. Kissinger handed over the document at the end of the meeting, Tab A.]

The difficult problem we now face is Cambodia. The North Vietnamese say they have no real influence because Sihanouk is in Peking and you are the only people who have influence. I frankly do not believe this is true. I

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

believe you have some influence but not the sole influence.

Here is the problem as we see it. We cannot be put in the position where the issue is settled by purely military means, because it is difficult for us to observe other parts of the Agreement if some parts are being systematically violated.

We agree with the objective which your Prime Minister pointed out to Ambassador Bruce--to have a neutral, independent and the Cambodia. As I said to your Prime Minister in Peking, our basic objective in Cambodia does not seem to us incompatible with China's objective. And frankly we do not think our basic objective in Indochina is incompatible with China's objective. We would like as far as possible to give each nation a chance to develop itself and to prevent a bloc which could support the hegemonial objectives of outside powers.

We recognize it is an extremely complex problem in Cambodia. But here is our tentative thinking—and there is some importance, if it is at all possible, in having some understanding before we go over again—which will be June 5.

Huang: June 5th.

Kissinger: June 5th. We are prepared to stop our bombing in Cambodia, and we are prepared to withdraw the very small advisory group we have there. And we are prepared to arrange for Lon Nol to leave for medical treatment in the United States. In return we would like a ceasefire—if necessary, say for ninety days—a negotiation between the Sihanouk group and the remainder of the Lon Nol group; and while this negotiation is going on in Cambodia, we would authorize some discussions between the staff of Ambassador Bruce and Prince Sihanouk in Peking. And when this process is completed, in some months, we would not oppose the return of Prince Sihanouk to Cambodia. But it is a process that has to extend over some time, and it must not be conducted in a way that does not take into account our own necessities.

We have not presented it in so much detail to the North Vietnamese, but we have presented the basic idea.

Now if we cannot come to an understanding, we will have to find means of pressure, no matter what Congress does--not on you but on the other parties there.

Huang: What do you mean by the other parties?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

PEPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Kissinger: The parties to the Paris Agreement. I mean the North Vietnamese. And then certainly, even if we sign this communique it will not be implemented. Because we can certainly not give economic assistance to the North Vietnamese under those conditions. So we want to bring this to the attention of the Prime Minister, first to show him we have taken his considerations to Ambasssador Bruce very seriously, and also to say to him that if we could reach some understanding or get some assistance prior to our next meeting, it could lead to permament peace in Indochina.

Huang: Well you have gone ahead of me on the question of Cambodia--because I also have got something for you.

Kissinger: When I become a really experienced diplomat, I will know-because the Ambassador will speak first!

Huang: We must show respect for you because you are our honored guest! [looks at talking paper] In his talk with Ambassador Bruce on May 18th, the Prime Minister touched on the question of Cambodia and the Premier mentioned the question of Cambodia could not be solved in Paris. It is imperative that the two sides respect the sovereignty of Cambodia.

Kissinger: The two sides, the North Vietnamese and...

Huang: The United States. On the Cambodian side, Prince Sihanouk as well as the resistance forces at home, are willing to conduct negotiations with the U.S. side. The Chinese side considers that the sooner the U.S. side stops its intervention in the affairs of Cambodia, the better. It will serve the overall interest. And Premier Chou En-lai also mentioned that Mr. Mansfield once asked for another visit to China, and he wondered whether he still has this desire.

<u>Kissinger:</u> He always has this desire, but he is not competent to talk for the United States Government with Si hanouk. But he still has this desire. I can let you know, or let your Ambassador know.

Huang: I just wanted to remind you of what the Prime Minister said to Ambassador Bruce.

Kissinger: We agree with the Prime Minister, the sovereignty of Cambodia must be respected. And we are prepared to stop all military action in the circumstances I described, and-we are willing to listen to other ideas on this subject. And we are also willing to let the members of Ambassador Bruce's staff begin conversations with Prince Sihanouk as soon as a ceasefire is

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHITEC

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

arranged in Cambodia. So we would be prepared to work within the spirit of what the Prime Minister has said.

Huang: I will convey what you have said about Cambodia to Peking.

Kissinger: Good.

• }